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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey. Adopting The
Unduly Burdensome Standard
I. INTRODUCTION

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
central holding in Roe v. Wade,2 firmly establishing that a woman has a
fundamental liberty right to choose to have an abortion guaranteed to her
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Casey is a,
plurality opinion coupled with a strong dissent.
This Casenote begins with a summary of the pertinent facts leading up
to the initial action. Next, the Casenote examines the Court's holding in
Casey and concludes with analysis of the Supreme Court opinion.
II. FACTUAL

STATEMENT

In 1988 and 1989, the State of Pennsylvania amended the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act ("the Act").' The amended statute required (1) a
woman to give her informed consent twenty-four hours prior to the performance of an abortion, (2) a minor to have parental informed consent,
or follow judicial by-pass procedures, (3) a married woman not fitting
within certain exceptions to notify her husband and (4) a clinic to follow
certain reporting requirements. Five abortion clinics and a physician
brought suit against the State of Pennsylvania, claiming various sections
of the 1988 and 1989 amendments to the Act were unconstitutional, and
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.7 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held all of the provisions unconstitu1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3.
4.

112 S. Ct. at 2804.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Kennedy announced the plurality opin-

ion. Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissented.
5. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1328 (1990).
6. 112 S. Ct. at 2803 (The contested provisions are 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203,
3205-3209, 3214 (1990)).

7.

Id.
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tional and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing them.8 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision as to
all of the regulations except the spousal notification provision," which it
affirmed as unconstitutional. 10 The Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals and remanded for a determination of severability of the unconstitutional parts of the Act."
The district court's findings of fact were undisputed regarding the
spousal notification provision and its affect on battered wives, abused
8. Id.
9. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1990). The spousal notification provision provides
as follows:
(a) Spousal notification required.-In order to further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship and to protect a spouse's
interests in having children within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of
that spouse's child, no physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman,
except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has received a
signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that she is about to
undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any false statement
made therein is punishable by law.
(b) Exceptions.-The statement certifying that the notice required by subsection
(a) has been given need not be furnished where the woman provides the physician
a signed statement certifying at least one of the following:
(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child.
(2) Her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located.
(3) The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault as described in section
3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), which has been reported to a law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction.
(4) The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice to her spouse
is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by her spouse or by
another individual. Such statement need not be notarized, but shall bear a notice
that any false statements made therein are punishable by law.
(c) Medical emergency.-The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply in
case of a medical emergency.
(d) Forms.-The department shall cause to be published, forms which may be
utilized for purposes of providing the signed statements required by subsections
(a) and (b). The department shall distribute an adequate supply of such forms to
all abortion facilities in this Commonwealth.
(a) Penalty; civil action.-Any physician who violates the provisions of this section
is guilty of "unprofessional conduct,'! and his or her license for the practice of
medicine and surgery shall be subject to suspension or revocation in accordance
with procedures provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P.L. 1109, No. 261),
known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts. In
addition, any physician who knowingly violates the provisions of this section shall
be civilly liable to the spouse who is the father of the aborted child for any damages caused thereby and for punitive damages in the amount of $5,000, and the
court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee as part of costs.
10. 112 S.Ct. at 2803.
ii. Id.
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children and the women who are often unable to tell their husbands
court in its
about an abortion."2 These findings of fact aided the district
13
decision to hold the contested provisions unconstitutional.
III. DETAILs

OF THE COURT'S OPINION

After reviewing the constitutional questions that Roe resolved, the rule
of stare decisis and the Court's need to uphold institutional integrity, the
Supreme Court in Casey reaffirmed the central holding in Roe that gave a
woman the "right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.""' The
Court overruled Roe's trimester framework and adopted the "unduly.burdensome" standard, a standard the Court had espoused in various other
cases. 15 Applying this standard to the Pennyslvania statute, the Court upheld all of the provisions except the spousal notification requirement.1 6
A. Roe's Fundamental Right
In Roe the Court concluded that a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion was implicit in the meaning of liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The central holding in Roe consisted of three parts.' The first part recognized a woman's right to choose
to have an abortion prior to viability without an imposition of an undue
burden by the state and that a state did not have sufficient interests " to
prohibit abortion prior to fetal viability.20 The second part recognized

that a state may prohibit abortion after fetal viability provided the regulation allowed exceptions for when the woman's life or health were endangered. 2 The third part recognized that the state has legitimate interests
12.
13.

Id. at 2826-28.
Id. at 2803.

14. Id. at 2817.
15. Id. at 2818-19. (Justice O'Connor defined the unduly burdensome standard in terms
of a statute that "burden[s] an individuals right to decide to prevent contraception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of affectuating that decision."
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting)).
16. 112 S. Ct. at 2821-33.
17. Id. at 2804.
18. Id.
19. The Court in Casey did not specifically define what would make the interests of the
state "sufficient." Rather, the Court acknowledged that the state has interests in both the
mother and the fetus throughout the pregnancy, and that the particular regulations a state
decides to implement in furtherance of its interests must be tested against the unduly burdensome standard. Id. at 2820-21.
20. Id. at 2804.
21. Id.
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throughout 2the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the unborn child
2
and mother.
The Court in Casey concluded that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the
specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment mark(ed] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 2 3 In an attempt to avoid imposition of their own moral code, the Court defined liberty not as a specific point, but as a broad sphere that encompasses any arbitrary interference imposed by the States.2 ' It is well-settled that in regards to a
person's basic decisions about marriage, family, and parenthood, the Constitution places limits on the State's right to interfere.2 The Court in
Casey saw Roe as an extension of these cases, and stated that while individual Justices may have reservations about Roe, the force of individual
liberty given to the people through previous cases outweighed these
2
reservations.
B. Stare Decisis
The Court in Casey begins its discussion of stare decisis by setting out
the "clearly erroneous" standard to be used in evaluating precedent: if
the decision is clearly in error, then it should be overruled.27 In determining whether a prior judicial ruling is clearly in error, the Court asks four
questions: 28 (1) Is the central holding of a case unworkable; (2) can the
limitation on State power be removed without causing significant unfairness to those who relied upon it or causing damage to the stability of
society; (3) have changes in society left the central holding a mere anachronism no longer followed by society; and (4) have the facts changed so
dramatically as to render it's central holding irrelevant regarding the issue at hand?2 1
Unworkability. The central holding in Roe has not proven unworkable."0 The Court in Casey acknowledged that the decision in Roe required courts to evaluate state regulations and will continue to require
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2805.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2806 (The Court decided these issues in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494

(1977)).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2807-08.
at 2808.
at 2808-09.
at 2809.
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evaluation.3 ' However, the Court stated this in no way rendered the holding in Roe unworkable.3 2
Reliance. The Court in Casey evaluated reliance by looking at how
overruling a prior case would affect those who have reasonably relied
upon the rule.3 8 The Court rejected Pennyslvania's arguments that reliance on abortion is dissimilar to reliance in commercial cases when it oc8 Rather,
curs most or that the reliance should be considered de minimis."
the Court stated that for two decades women have been relying on abortion as a method to prevent childbirth and this ability to obtain an abortion has facilitated women's participation in economic and social life.35
The Court concluded that reliance by women on the ability to abort is
difficult to determine.86 The Court stated that this difficulty did not outwomen the Court
weigh the burdens that would be imposed on the many
87
decided had actually relied on the ability to abort.
Evolution of a Legal Principle. Roe is part of a long line of cases
defining the liberty rights of personal relationships. 8 When viewed as one
case in a series of cases, the Court in Casey found Roe not obsolete.8 9 No
subsequent constitutional issues have developed that lessen the scope of
"protection accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the
family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child."' 0
The Court pointed out that by classifying Roe as sui generis, there has
been no disturbance of its central holding in Roe.4 Six members of the
Court expressly affirmed Roe's holding in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health;2 five members affirmed Roe in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians;'"and a majority either reaffirmed Roe or
declined to address the issue in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.4" The Court stated that this increased, not diminished Roe's
validity.'
31.
32.
33.
34.

5

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2810.
Id.

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
492 U.S. 490 (1989).

45. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
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The Court also noted that any error in Roe related to the strength of
the state's interest in fetal protection and not to the scope of the liberty
right.' The Court proved Roe's soundness by comparing the alternative
situation of a -state prohibiting women from carrying a fetus to term."
The Court stated that had the Court failed to grant to women a liberty
right to choose to abort or carry a child to term, the state could easily
refuse to allow a woman to have a baby. 4' However in Arnold v. Board of
Education" and Avery v. County of Burke,"0 courts relied on Roe to disallow. States from coercing women into having abortions or unwarranted
sterilization."1
Factual Assumptions in Roe. In 1973, the Court in Roe assumed
that abortions were "safest" up until the end of the first trimester, The
Court also assumed that the fetus became viable approximately at the
end of the second trimester." Since this decision in 1973, medical advances have shown that physicians can safely perform abortions much
later in pregnancy than the first trimester and that fetal viability can occur at points earlier than the third trimester." These medical advancements do not affect the validity of Roe's holding that acknowledges the
fact that the states have interests in protecting the mother and the fetus
throughout pregnancy. 5" While fetal viability may occur earlier in a pregnancy than was thought in 1973, the Court in Casey pointed out that this
had no bearing upon the use of fetal viability as a guideline for determining when a state's interest becomes compelling." Therefore, since fetal
viability, whenever it may occur, is still a feasible marker for determining
state's interest, the Court determined that no factual changes have rendered the holding in Roe obsolete.' 7
The Court previously applied these same four questions to two other
lines of cases, those involving economic substantive due process and the
46. Id. at 2810-11.
47. Id. at 2811.
48. Id.
49. 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989).
50. 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1981).
51. 112 S. Ct. at 2811. (The Court relies on Arnold v. Board of Educ.; 880 F.2d 305 (11th
Cir. 1989) (in which a court of appeals concluded that state officers could not force an underage female to have an abortion); and Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.
1981) (in which a county attempted to force a teenage girl to undergo sterilization).
52. 410 U.S. at 164-65.

53. Id.
54.

112 S. Ct. at 2811.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2811-12.
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seperate-but-equal rule." Both lines of cases involved changed circumstances, and changed opinions by society about those cirumstances."s The
Court stated that the facts that surrounded Roe were not so fundamen-

tally different, nor had society's understanding of the holding in Roe
changed.60 The Court pointed out that since neither changed circumstances nor changed opinions by society about those circumstances existed, the only reason for reexamining Roe would be to reach a different
decision from that of the Court in 1973.61 Instead, the Court followed the
view "that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior decision was wrongly decided."'
C. Institutional Integrity of the Court
The Court concluded that overruling Roe would diminish the Court's
judicial power and functioning ability." The Court's power comes from
its legitimacy.6s Failing to decide an issue based on sound legal principles
and instead succumbing to political and social pressures would undermine
the Court's legitimacy." The Court stated two situations in which overuling a past decision would cause the Court to lose its legitimacy." First,
because society perceives an overruled decision as wrong in the first place,
the Court loses legitimacy when it frequently overrules prior decisions.67
Second, when a case such as Roe required the nation to accept the rule
and end a controversy, the Court loses its legitimacy when overruling
58. Id. at 2812-13. (The Court's discussion of economic substantive due process relied on
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (in which the Court imposed limitations on the
state's ability to regulate individual's right to contract); and Adkins v.Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923) (in which the Court allowed employers to escape paying minimum wage to
female employees because of their "right" to contract). West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), overruled Adkins. The overruling of Adkins coupled with the Depression
led to a change in society's beliifs about contractual freedom and whether or not it could

effectively regulate the marketplace to satisfy minimum wage levels.
The Court began its discussion of the separate-but-equal analysis with Plessy v. Ferguson,

163 U.S. 537 (1896), when the Court upheld a legislative mandate for separate riding compartments for black and white persons on public transportation. The Court rejected the

seperate-but-equal analysis in the public school system in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). (The Court in Brown stated that society's understanding in 1896 was fun-

damentally different than in 1954 regarding the relations between black and white persons).
59. 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
60. Id,
61. Id. at 2813-14.
62. Id. at 2814.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 2815.
Id.
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such a case." In the latter, only the most compelling justification by the
Court could override the presumption that the Court succumbed to political pressure.6 The Court in Casey refused to breach the faith with a
society that expects the Court to uphold its "promise of constancy...,
bind[ing] its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamen'7 0
tally as to render the commitment obsolete.

The Court stated that its concern for its own legitimacy is concern for
the country; if the Court loses legitimacy so does the nation which sees
itself through the ideals of the Constitution, which the Court is sworn to
uphold.71 While loss of legitimacy may be restored slowly over time, the
Court can not regain, legitimacy by re-election.7 Therefore, overruling
Roe would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Court and society's
belief in the rule of law.7

D. Adoption of the Unduly Burdensome Test
Adopting Justice O'Connor's definition, the Court defined an "undue
burden" as a burden imposed by the state that places a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an abortion.7 ' The Court rejected the
trimester framework as not part of the central holding of Roe, and
adopted the unduly burdensome standard as a means of determining
when a state's regulation oversteps permissible bounds.7 5 Adoption of the
unduly burdensome standard is the only issue in Casey that commands a
majority opinion.6 The Court reasoned that the trimester framework fails
to show the reality of the pregnant woman's interests and gives less
weight to the state's interest in the unborn.7 7 Rather than give breadth to
the holding in Roe that it did not intend, the Court concluded that the
use of the unduly burdensome standard would more appropriately balance the mother's liberty right and the state's interest in the unborn.7 If
a court finds a burden to be undue, the burden is unconstitutional and
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

Id.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 2816.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2820.
75. Id. at 2818.
76. Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun concur with the plurality in the adoption of
the unduly burdensome standard. Id. at 2842-43, 2845 (Stevens, J., concurring and Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
78. Id. at 2820.

1993]
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fails to be a permissible use of the state's means in achieving its legitimate objectives."
A woman's liberty right did not guarantee an unqualified right, but a
right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 80 By following the trimester framework, the Court refused
any intervention by the state prior to fetal viability, and failed to recognize its holding in Roe that the state has substantial interests in the unborn throughout pregnancy, not just during the third trimester."
E. Application of the Unduly Burdensome Standard to the Pennyslvania Statute
The Court upheld all the Act's sections except for the spousal notification provision.2 The Court concluded that while a twenty-four hour waiting period may cause some additional burden ori a woman, it did not constitute a substantial obstacle. 83 The Court found that informed consent is
constitutional even if it expresses a desire for childbirth over abortion as
long as the information given to the women is truthful and not misleading.8 ' The Court upheld the parental consent provision based on prior
decisions upholding identical statutes.8 5 Reporting requirements are constitutional as long as they are "reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and ... properly respect a patient's confidentiality.""6
In analyzing whether the spousal notification provision imposed a substantial obstacle upon a woman, the Court deferred to the district court's
findings about family violence, battered wives and the reasons women
have for not informing their spouse and concluded that the provision did
impose a substantial obstacle."'
F. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality's
view regarding stare decisis and with the societal costs of overruling
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2819 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).

81. Id. at 2820.
82. Id. at 2821.

83. Id. at 2825.
84. Id. at 2823.
85. Id. at 2832 (In various cases, such as Akron v. Akron Reproductive Servs., 462 U.S.
416 (1983), the Court upheld provisions requiring parental consent as long as the statute
provided for judicial bypass procedures).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2826-29.
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Roe." He emphasized "that the fetus is [not] a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."" Justice Stevens,
however, disagreed with the plurality's application of the unduly burdensome standard to the Act, believing that the proper application of the
unduly burdensome test would render the twenty-four hour waiting period, counseling provisions and persuasive notification requirements
unconstitutional."0
In a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun concurred with the plurality
and Justice Stevens decision to reaffirm the central holding in Roe."' He
also concurred with the plurality that the "Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establishes 'a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter.' ""2 Justice Blackmun dissented with the plu-

rality's application of the unduly burdensome test to the content-based
counseling, twenty-four hour delay, informed parental consent and recordkeeping provisions of the Act.' 3 Justice Blackmun argued that the

plurality based its decision on the "insufficiency of the record before it."'
He believed that future evidence would show that the above-named provisions did impose a substantial obstacle upon a woman attempting to
obtain an abortion.'8
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas dissented in a separate opinion.'6 The dissent looked to the historical traditions of the American people through the abortion statutes
existing at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and at abortion
statutes existing at the time of the Court's decision in Roe, and concluded
that none support the view that the right to terminate one's pregnancy is
fundamental.97 Since a woman's right to choose to have an abortion was
not a fundamental right, the dissent stated that the proper analysis would
be to determine whether a state's regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 5 The dissent stated that the rational basis test
would avoid the problems that the plurality's undue burdensome analysis
created." Applying the rational basis test to state regulations would avoid
the Court imparting "its own preferences to the States," and give the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 2838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2840-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting 112 S. Ct. at 2805).
Id. at 2843-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2845 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2855-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2858-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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lower courts a guideline that the unduly burdensome test failed to give.100
Applying the rational basis test, the dissent concluded that the Act
should be upheld in its entirety.1"'
Justice Scalia, in a separate dissenting opinion, concluded that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion was not a liberty right protected by the Constitution. ' He concluded this because the Constitution
mentions nothing about a right to choose to have an abortion, and the
traditions of American society "have permitted it to be legally proscribed."108 Justice Scalia agreed that if the Court need deal with the issue'at all instead of allowing society to vote on it, the proper analysis was
the rational basis test, and all the contested provisions should be
upheld. 1'"

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 08 the Supreme Court once again
faced the moral dilemma and intense conflict surrounding a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion. By reaffirming its previous holding in
Roe and adopting the unduly burdensome standard in place of the trimester framework, the Court attempted to resolve the problems in appli0 While the Court in Casey resolved Roe's
cation of Roe by the states.'1
problems, it created new problems of its own.
The adoption of the trimester -framework attempted to' give the lower
courts a time frame from which they could determine if a state's objective
was unconstitutional.' 0 ' Since the Court relied on the time frame by
which safe abortions may be performed and the time by which a fetus
becomes viable to set up the trimester framework, debates ensued when
technology showed that abortions may be performed safely much later
than the first trimester and that a fetus may become viable much earlier
than the third trimester.'" s After Casey, these debates should no longer
be an issue. The Court drew the line at which the state's interests become
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at'2866 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2873 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.

104.
105,
106.

Id. at 2873, 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2791.
Id. at 2817-18.

107. Id.
108, The Court dealt with these debates in Akron, 462 U.S. at 457-58 n.5 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), when Justice O'Connor discussed recent studies that show viability may occur
much earlier than once thought, and in Webster, 492 U.S. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
when Justice O'Connor addressed the issue requiring physicians to test for viability prior to

the third trimester.
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compelling at viability regardless of when viability actually occurs.'" Although the debates will end, this now adds additional requirements on
physicians to perform tests at various times during pregnancy to determine if a fetus has reached viability, instead of merely relying on whether
the mother had reached her sixth month of pregnancy.
Prior to Casey, the courts needed to look only to the trimester a woman
fell within to determine whether a state could restrict an abortion. 110 Now
the Court in reaffirming its muddled central holding in Roe allows the
state to regulate abortion prior to the third trimester as long as the regulation does not pose a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion."'
This forces the courts to determine the difference between an incidental
12
effect resulting in difficulty and an undue burden.
The Court in Casey attempted to aid the lower courts by defining an
undue burden as a burden that has "the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."" s The dissent is correct in stating that the plurality's analysis gives little aid to the lower courts in defining exactly what an undue
burden is. Instead of using the objective framework set up by Roe's trimesters to determine the rights of women and the states, the courts are
forced to employ the subjective "unduly burdensome" analysis and hope
not to impart their own biases. Using the Court's application of the standard to the Acjt, the lower courts are to assume that a twenty-four hour
waiting period, informed consent, parental informed consent and reporting procedures do not constitute substantial obstacles while spousal notification provisions do."' However, these guidelines are subject to certain
exceptions,"s and do not fully encompass the many possible situations
that may arise. These contested provisions facially do not constitute undue burdens. However, once applied, the provisions will increase the costs
associated with abortions, which will adversely affect those women least
able to fight against the state. The plurality even admits that in some
cases increased costs could become a substantial obstacle, but in the rec-

109. 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
110. Id. at 2817-18.

111. Id. at 2817 (The Court states that in subsequent cases, the Court afforded too little
weight to the state's interest as being valid throughout pregnancy. Rather these cases adhered strictly to the trimester framework, and disallowed any regulation by the state prior
to viability. So, the Court chose to rely on Roe's central holding rather than the subsequent
cases that muddled Roe's central holding).
112. Id. at 2819.
113. Id. at 2820.

114. Id. at 2822-33.
115. Id. (The various provisions of the Act are subject to life and health endangerment
exceptions.).
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ord before them there was no such evidence. 1 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun stressed that the plurality rested its decision on insufficient evidence regarding how much of a burden the various Pennyslvania
statutes imposed on women, and that the plurality had not ruled out the
possibility that in the future, evidence could show that the provisions did
impose an undue burden. 117 If new evidence can prove that the contested
provisions pose undue burdens, the courts will be unable to rely on Casey
as a guide for what types of regulations are impermissible.
These conflicting views about the possible application of the unduly
burdensome standard show that its adoption, an attempt to resolve
problems in application of Roe's balancing of interests, will inevitably result in confusion among the lower courts and more conflicts between
states attempting to introduce regulations that they feel have only incidental effects on women, and the women who feel the regulations impose
an undue burden.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Casey upheld all but one of the various provisions of a Pennyslvania statute allowing the state to regulate certain procedures in the abortion process. The Court reaffirmed its central holding
in Roe, rejected the trimester framework, and adopted the unduly burdensome standard. Adoption of the unduly burdensome standard, while
attempting to resolve the problems in application of Roe, only will result
in creating new conflicts of its own.
SARA

116. Id. at 2833.
117.

Id. at 2845 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
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